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REGISTERED SAVINGS PLANS AND THE 
MAKING OF MIDDLE-CLASS CANADA:  
TOWARD A PERFORMATIVE THEORY 
OF TAX POLICY 
Lisa Philipps* 
 
Juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Campaigning politicians and elected governments across Canada’s 
political spectrum strive to position themselves as defenders of the middle 
class.  This is to be expected given the large proportion of the Canadian 
population that self-identifies as middle class.2  Since the term lacks 
precision, it is a claim that can accommodate a wide range of policy 
proposals.  Tax policy serves as a prime vehicle for making this appeal to 
middle-class voters.  Undoubtedly, any tax reform proposal can be 
examined critically to evaluate its likely distributional impacts and how 
well these map onto specific definitions of the middle class.  This Article 
attempts, however, a different project.  Drawing on the ideas of Judith 
Butler, it analyzes instead how tax policy produces middle-class identity 
through the very process of claiming to advance middle-class interests.  The 
case study for this purpose is the rise of tax incentives for saving as a 
prominent feature of Canadian personal tax policy over the two decades 
 
*  Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.  The author thanks Fiona 
Xiaoyu Lin for essential research assistance, as well as Brenda Cossman and David 
Schneiderman for helpful conversations on the writings of Judith Butler.  Participants at the 
Fordham Law Review symposium entitled We Are What We Tax and the University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law’s James S. Hausman Tax Law and Policy Workshop provided 
valuable comments on earlier drafts.  All deficiencies are the responsibility of the author.  
For an overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda 
Sugin, Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 5 
(1999). 
 2. The proportion self-identifying as middle class traditionally has been over 60 
percent, though this has slipped since 2009 and, in 2013, polled at only 47 percent. See 
Political Landscape Freezes with Winter Cold:  Less than Half of Canadians See Themselves 
As Middle Class, EKOS POLITICS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/ 
2013/12/political-landscape-freezes-with-winter-cold-december-19-2013/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W2F5-4GBY]. 
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from 1995 to 2015.  In the nomenclature of the Income Tax Act (ITA), 
these vehicles traditionally have been described as “registered plans.”3  I 
suggest that the presentation, design, and language of registered savings 
plans have shaped the content of middle-class identity, including the 
behaviors, expectations, and aspirations that condition membership in this 
identity group. 
Thinking about tax policy this way, as actively producing rather than 
simply reflecting preexisting understandings of the middle class, is helpful 
in a number of ways.  First, it helps to explain the remarkable surge and 
continued salience of savings tax incentives as a policy response to 
economic insecurity and precarity, even in the face of mounting evidence 
that they are ineffective or inadequate solutions to these problems.  More 
generally, it helps to account for why some tax policy ideas gain traction 
with influential policy actors and find fertile ground with voters at 
particular times.  Tax policy analysts are inclined to understand the 
proliferation of registered savings plans as a product of economic theories 
about the advantages of taxing consumption rather than income.  Yet, 
scholars have debated these theories for more than half a century, and few 
members of the political class, the civil service, Parliament, the media, or 
the public have more than passing familiarity with them.  Why did they leap 
to the fore in the mid-1990s?  Finally, seeing tax policy as performative of 
middle-class identity provides a clue about why tax reform lately has taken 
on the aura of a culture war in Canada, one that carries moral overtones and 
that delivers wedge issues to election platforms with stunning regularity. 
In elaborating this idea of performative tax policy, I am in part pursuing 
answers to an age-old question about the channels and processes by which 
expert knowledge on occasion gets translated into public policy and 
legislation.  I am also asserting that the question framed this way is too 
narrow and unidirectional because it fails to ask how tax laws in turn shape 
the range of policy options considered thinkable.  Examining the narratives 
of middle-class identity that are propagated through tax law helps to explain 
the history of tax policy ideas and why certain policy trajectories may 
endure even in the face of evidence that they are exacerbating rather than 
alleviating problems of economic inequality and insecurity. 
I.  BUTLER’S PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF GENDER 
AS A LENS FOR ANALYZING TAX POLICY 
In her groundbreaking book Gender Trouble, first published in 1990, 
Judith Butler challenged feminist theorists to rethink the distinction 
between sex and gender and to recognize the social exclusions that are 
created in the process of asserting equality claims on behalf of women as a 
 
 3. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (Can.).  The ITA was published as a separate 
supplement to the 1985 statutes.  See, for example, the definitions of “registered pension 
plan,” “registered retirement income fund,” “registered disability savings plan,” and 
“registered education savings plan.” Id. § 248(1). 
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group.4  She observed how critiques of patriarchal oppression, and calls for 
change in the name of equality, rely implicitly upon foundationalist notions 
of both sex and gender as stable or pre-given identities from which visions 
of reform can be articulated and political actions taken.  Butler sought to 
trouble the notion that gender, or even sex, is susceptible to any such 
conclusive definition.  Instead, she advanced a performative theory of 
gender identity as an ever-shifting product of our own behaviors and claims 
about it:  “[W]hat we take to be ‘real,’ what we invoke as the naturalized 
knowledge of gender is, in fact, a changeable and revisable reality.”5  As a 
result, gender identity is, to some extent, “a normative ideal rather than a 
descriptive feature of experience.”6  It is a moving target, one that is never 
closed but rather “a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred.”7  
Moreover, the performance of gender identity is not a “singular act, but a 
repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization 
in the context of a body.”8  Registered savings plans, with their 
requirements for repetitive, ongoing participation and their deferral of 
promised rewards to the future, are well-suited to this process of identity 
performance and production. 
Butler ascribed a particular role to law in generating identities, as 
suggested by the passage quoted at the outset of this Article:  “Juridical 
power inevitably ‘produces’ what it claims merely to represent.”9  This is a 
caution to theorists and activists who would see a route through law, or 
state authority more generally, to dismantling hierarchies of gender and sex.  
Invoking law on behalf of particular subjects necessarily entails defining 
the group that is to be helped.  This process of definition is an exclusory 
one, setting boundaries that inscribe the limits of an identity recognized by 
law.  A norm enacted or applied in the service of some group, however 
broad, also signifies who is outside the charmed circle.  These exclusions 
“reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even 
when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes.”10  
Butler’s insight is that law cannot merely incorporate or reflect preexisting 
identity formations, but must produce and assert them actively.  For this 
reason, 
it is not enough to inquire into how women might become more fully 
represented in language and politics.  Feminist critique ought also to 
understand how the category of “women,” the subject of feminism, is 
produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which 
emancipation is sought.11 
 
 4. See BUTLER, supra note 1, at 3–8. 
 5. Id. at xxiii. 
 6. Id. at 23. 
 7. Id. at 22. 
 8. Id. at xv. 
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
 11. Id. at 5. 
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The production of these social categories implies hierarchy as it conditions 
the possibilities for subjects to be recognized within “culturally intelligible 
notions of identity.”12  Subjects may exercise agency and resist the 
constraints of accepted performances of gender, but to do so is “to risk 
unrecognizability[] and the various punishments that await those who do 
not conform to the social order.”13  Even as normative identities remain 
open to resistance and revision, then, this process of change occurs within a 
set of constraints that exerts real coercive force. 
Viewed through the lens of performativity, income tax law is a potent site 
for identity production.  It engages at every turn in drawing distinctions 
among taxpayers based on social and economic traits thought to be relevant 
for purposes of designing the system.  All of the core structural elements of 
the income tax—the unit, base, accounting period, and rate structure—rest 
on judgments about what individual or family circumstances should be 
taken into account and how and when these should impact tax liability.  
These judgments are filtered through a set of tax policy criteria, which 
require the law to compare and slot people into groups.  The tax policy 
concept of “equity” calls for people in similar (or different) circumstances 
to be taxed similarly (or with appropriate differences).  In order to meet the 
requirement of “administrability,” however, the legislation cannot actually 
assess circumstances individually, but rather must define a series of groups 
whose tax treatment should be differentiated in some manner.  At the same 
time the tax law strives for “neutrality,” that is not altering the choices that 
individuals would make in the absence of the tax rule.  This principle 
requires heroic assumptions about people’s default choices in some 
marketplace or state of nature that exists theoretically prior to and outside of 
the tax system.  Some of these assumptions refer straight back to notions of 
identity, including gender identity (for example, what is the assumed 
default choice of mothers of young children, as between unpaid caregiving 
and participating in the labor market?).14 
The capacity for identity production through tax law is further magnified 
by the use of tax expenditures to advance other, nonfiscal objectives of 
government.  Tax expenditures drop any claim to neutrality in an overt 
effort to encourage particular behaviors or to target particular groups of 
taxpayers for support.  Tax-sheltered savings plans, whether viewed as a 
refinement of the technical tax system toward a consumption base or as a 
series of tax expenditures, confer beneficial treatment on those who exhibit 
certain traits and behaviors.  They impose precise requirements as to who 
can contribute how much, from what sources of income, for what purposes, 
and under what conditions to realize the preferential tax treatment offered 
by the legislation, as well as the implied benefits of future economic 
 
 12. Id. at 23. 
 13. Judith Butler, Bodies and Power Revisited, in FEMINISM AND THE FINAL FOUCAULT 
192 (Diana Taylor & Karen Vintges eds., 2004). 
 14. See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008) 
(criticizing the normative content of these classic tax policy objectives and particularly their 
focus on economic characteristics over all other features of identity). 
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security and autonomy.  Through the manner in which registered savings 
plans purport to serve middle-class interests, I argue they also 
simultaneously advance a particular normative ideal of middle-class 
identity, one which aligns with a larger political shift toward neoliberal 
styles of governance. 
A possible objection to this analysis is that Butler’s theory of 
performativity was developed in relation to gender, not class, and that class 
is rooted in more objective measures of socioeconomic status that do not 
lend themselves as easily to redefinition through language and practice.  
One response to this concern is to point out that class identity also is 
gendered.  Being married to a domestically focused woman became a mark 
of middle-class respectability with the rise of industrial capitalism.15  This 
normative ideal of supporting a stay-at-home wife continues to have 
purchase with some Canadian voters, as evidenced by recent initiatives to 
move away from individual taxation and allow conjugal-unit taxation for 
pension income and for couples with dependent children.16  Even setting 
aside the issue of intersecting class and gender identities, however, class 
itself is likewise a product of historical, social construction. 
Quantitative measures of class status are notoriously contentious among 
those who study them for a living.  Philip Cross and Munir A. Sheikh 
reviewed the diverse definitions employed by economists, sociologists, and 
statisticians and observed “there is nothing remotely approaching a 
consensus on what constitutes the middle class” or even “whether [it] can 
be measured in economic terms.”17  Financial measures range across 
income, wealth, and consumption, with varying methodologies and 
assumptions for each.18  Among the many indicators surveyed by Cross and 
Sheikh, the following is especially germane to registered savings plans:  
“what income is needed to start accumulating significant amounts of wealth 
to provide the security associated with a middle-class existence and the 
saving to make the investments in human capital needed to protect it.”19 
 
 15. See LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES:  MEN AND WOMEN 
OF THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS, 1780–1850, at 286–87 (1987); Dorothy Smith, Women, the 
Family and Corporate Capitalism, 20 BERKLEY J. SOC. 55 (1976) (discussing the role of 
wives in securing the moral status of the managerial middle class in corporate capitalism). 
 16. See Lisa Philipps, Real Versus Notional Income Splitting—What Canada Should 
Learn from the US “Innocent Spouse” Problem, 61 CAN. TAX J. 709 (2013); Frances 
Woolley, Liability Without Control—The Curious Case of Pension Income Splitting, 55 
CAN. TAX J. 603 (2007); see also Lisa Philipps, Income Splitting and Gender Equality:  The 
Case for Incentivizing Intra-Household Wealth Transfers 1 (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. York 
Univ., CLPE Research Paper No. 04/2010, 2010). 
 17. Philip Cross & Munir A. Sheikh, Caught in the Middle:  Some in Canada’s Middle 
Class Are Doing Well; Others Have Good Reason to Worry 2 (Univ. of Calgary:  The Sch. 
of Pub. Policy, SPP Research Paper No. 8:12, 2015). 
 18. Income is the most commonly used, but specific definitions vary significantly 
depending on factors such as the unit of analysis (individuals or defined households), the 
ranges used to distinguish groups (deciles, quintiles, or some percentage or dollar range 
around the mean or median income), whether income is measured before or after taxes and 
transfers, and the choice of data source (for example, household surveys versus income tax 
returns). See, e.g., id. at 4–19. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
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Some assert that middle-class status depends instead on nonmonetary 
characteristics, such as tastes, values, lifestyles, type of occupation, 
ownership of a home or other possessions associated with being middle 
class in particular historical periods, or biomedical measures of health and 
life expectancy.20  Even self-definition is used to define middle-class status, 
though Cross and Sheikh comment that this is “subjective” and lacks 
“statistical rigour.”21  It is precisely these qualities, however, that make 
“middle class-ness” a feature of personal identity that cannot be entirely 
verified or closed off by reference to external, measurable indicia. 
The essential indeterminacy of middle class means that definitional 
choices have normative content.  As Piketty has observed, “The way the 
population is divided up [into classes] usually reflects an implicit or explicit 
position concerning the justice and legitimacy of the amount of income or 
wealth claimed by a particular group.”22  In claiming to address middle-
class interests, tax policymakers must choose among many possible 
meanings and take a stand about who belongs to this group.  This exercise 
involves marking both upper and lower bounds, whether explicitly or not, 
and setting out other requirements to access tax preferences.  On the low 
end, those without the means to partake in middle-class tax incentives are 
rendered marginal and in need of more targeted and more stigmatized 
benefits.23  The upper bound marks off those considered too privileged to 
require government assistance.  Cross and Sheikh question the generosity of 
this upper bound, arguing that tax and transfer policies ostensibly targeting 
the broad middle class have delivered the most help to its higher income 
segments at the expense of those with below-average earnings.24  Casting 
tax benefits as middle-class programs thus can obscure distributive impacts 
that favor the affluent while also sending a message about the conditions for 
escaping marginality. 
It is worth noting that Butler herself asserted that material well-being or 
class cannot be disentangled from the cultural valuation of different 
identities of gender, race, sexuality, et cetera.  In a famous exchange with 
Nancy Fraser, Butler objected to the portrayal of some identity politics as 
mainly concerned with remedying cultural (as distinct from socioeconomic) 
injustices.  Fraser had argued that in struggling for “recognition,” 
identitarian movements risked detracting from political projects aimed at 
socioeconomic “redistribution.”25  In rejecting the divisibility of these 
 
 20. See id. at 2. 
 21. Id. at 23. 
 22. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 251 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014). 
 23. David Schneiderman examined the association of universalistic social programs with 
middle-class values in Canada against targeted, income-tested benefits that are more 
stigmatized and subject to heavier constitutional scrutiny. See David Schneiderman, 
Universality Vs. Particularity:  Litigating Middle Class Values Under Section 15, 33 SUP. 
CT. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 24. See Cross & Sheikh, supra note 17, at 9–10, 12. 
 25. See Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition:  Dilemmas of Justice in a 
“Post-Socialist” Age, NEW LEFT REV., July–Aug. 1995, at 68 [hereinafter Fraser, From 
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categories, Butler pointed to the ways in which property, immigration, 
health, and tax laws, for example, regulate the distribution of entitlements 
based on concepts of family that are suffused with gender and sexual 
identities.26 
I am asserting, then, that being middle class is a feature of identity that 
encompasses more than quantifiable economic characteristics.  It is open, 
not susceptible to definitional closure, and, to some extent, “a normative 
ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience.”27  It is performative in 
the sense of being constructed and revised over time through language and 
political practice, including in tax law and its surrounding discourses.  At 
the same time, it is coercive and exclusory, describing who is left out as 
much as who is included.  The development of registered savings plans over 
the past two decades has provided occasions for tax law and policymakers 
to produce normative understandings of middle-class expectations and 
responsibilities.  Individual citizens act out these understandings by 
arranging their affairs (or not) to meet the requirements of tax preferences, 
internalizing them over time as part of what it means to pursue a middle-
class life in a neoliberal age. 
II.  TAX INCENTIVES FOR PERSONAL SAVING:  
ORIGINS, RATIONALES, AND NARRATIVES 
The development of pro-savings tax measures in Canada has been shaped 
by at least three important influences.  First, its intellectual roots lie in the 
school(s) of thought favoring consumption over income as the ideal base for 
personal taxation, an idea usually traced to the work of Nicholas Kaldor in 
the 1950s.28  Consumption tax advocates have generated a wide range of 
tax reform proposals, with tax preferences for personal saving being but one 
subset of these.29  The distributive and welfare impacts of consumption 
taxes generally, and personal savings incentives specifically, remain 
contentious among tax policy experts to this day.30  Nonetheless, the 
influence of consumption tax theory is undeniable in Canada’s steady shift 
toward lower taxation of capital income.  Though the federal personal 
 
Redistribution to Recognition]; Nancy Fraser, Heterosexism, Misrecognition and Capitalism:  
A Response to Judith Butler, NEW LEFT REV., Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 140. 
 26. Judith Butler, Merely Cultural, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 33, 41. 
 27. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 23. 
 28. See generally NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955).  Robin Boadway 
reviewed the evolution of consumption tax theories in Piecemeal Tax Reform Ideas for 
Canada—Lessons from Principle and Practice, 62 CAN. TAX J. 1029 (2014). 
 29. See generally Jonathan R. Kesselman & Finn Poschmann, Expanding the 
Recognition of Personal Savings in the Canadian Tax System, 49 CAN. TAX J. 40 (2001) 
(applying consumption tax principles in proposing a tax-prepaid savings vehicle, 
contributing directly to the adoption of the Tax Free Savings Account in 2009).  For a 
critical review of the main varieties of consumption tax reform proposals as applied to 
Canada, see Jonathan Rhys Kesselman & Peter S. Spiro, Challenges in Shifting Canadian 
Taxation Toward Consumption, 62 CAN. TAX J. 1 (2014). 
 30. See, e.g., Kesselman & Spiro, supra note 29.  For more information, see also the 
divergent perspectives published in Volume 60 of the Canadian Tax Journal policy forum. 
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income tax remains the country’s biggest single revenue raiser, its base is in 
fact “much closer to consumption than income for the great majority of 
taxpayers other than those at the highest income and wealth levels.”31  The 
introduction of new and more generous registered savings plans has been 
one part of this trend. 
The dynamics of fiscal federalism have been a second key influence on 
the development of pro-savings tax measures.  Both federal and provincial 
governments have constitutional authority to impose income taxes in 
Canada.32  In practice, however, the federal government plays the dominant 
role in driving tax policy.  Provinces (other than Quebec) have ceded much 
of their autonomy by entering tax collection agreements that require them to 
adopt the federal definition of the tax base in exchange for the Canada 
Revenue Agency administering provincial income tax laws.33  In effect, this 
gives the federal Parliament exclusive authority to legislate the deductions, 
exemptions, and deferred inclusions, which form the core design elements 
of registered plans.  When it does so, the provinces automatically share the 
revenue costs, because of the common definition of income.34  In addition, 
the federal government favors tax instruments because it lacks 
constitutional authority to deliver direct programming in areas of health, 
education, and social welfare, which are matters of provincial jurisdiction.  
Federal politicians and policymakers therefore gravitate to tax-based 
programs as one of the few ways they can reach individual Canadians. 
These intergovernmental dynamics help to explain the growth of tax-
preferred savings vehicles as a feature of federal policy, proving once again 
J. Harvey Perry’s assertion that “the federal form of our governmental 
structure” has been perhaps the strongest influence on the development of 
Canadian tax policy since confederation.35  Moreover, in building registered 
savings plans, the federal government has effectively moved into policy 
fields such as pensions and education in a way that constrains future 
decision making at the provincial level.  When crafting their own programs, 
provinces largely are compelled to work with the design choices embedded 
in the federal tax system.  A recent example is Ontario’s move to create a 
new public pension plan.  In order to receive the tax preferences accorded to 
other pension vehicles, the Ontario Retirement Pension Plan (ORPP) must 
be designed to meet ITA requirements as understood and administered by 
 
 31. Kesselman & Spiro, supra note 29, at 4. 
 32. Constitution Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, §§ 91(3), 92(2) (Eng.). 
 33. See DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION OF PROVINCIAL TAXES:  NEW 
DIRECTIONS (2000).  For an example of how these agreements are implemented, see 
Ontario’s Taxation Act, S.O. 2007, c 11, sched. A, § 1 (Can.) (defining “Federal Act” and 
“income”). 
 34. See generally MOWAT CTR., BACK FROM THE BRINK:  LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL-
PROVINCIAL DISPUTE ABOUT THE ONTARIO RETIREMENT PENSION PLAN (2016) (discussing 
recent policy conflicts arising from federal control over the income tax base and advancing a 
proposal to reform the tax collection agreements to give provinces greater autonomy to set 
public policy in areas where they have constitutional authority, including pensions). 
 35. Richard Krever, The Origin of Federal Income Taxation in Canada, 3 CAN. TAX’N 
170, 170 (1981) (quoting J. HARVEY PERRY, TAXATION IN CANADA 3–4 (2d ed. 1953)). 
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the Canada Revenue Agency.36  Doing so makes sense because it will 
reduce costs for members, employers, and the plan administrator, but it also 
curtails the design options open to Ontario.37 
A third influence feeding the growth of registered savings plans was the 
broad turn to neoliberal governance in Canada, characterized by deference 
to market imperatives, a diminished role for pro-equality redistributive 
policies, and an emphasis on promoting individual self-reliance and familial 
responsibility to address human welfare needs.38  This shift began in the 
late 1980s in Canada and was well underway by 1995, the start of the 
period under study.  Registered savings plans should be seen as part of a 
government response to growing public anxieties about precarity and 
insecurity in the face of global economic integration and neoliberal 
restructuring. 
Each of these three influences—consumption tax theory, fiscal 
federalism, and neoliberalism—are evident in the public rationales that have 
been offered for creating or expanding registered savings plans.  As detailed 
below, they are typically presented as measures that will encourage 
personal saving to meet future needs and help middle-class Canadians 
accumulate assets to provide for themselves and their children.  Before 
examining these narratives more closely, it is important to note the dearth of 
evidence to substantiate the effectiveness of registered plans in achieving 
these ostensible goals. 
Empirical studies generally have cast doubt on the claim that tax 
incentives for saving actually spur individuals to save more.39  There is 
little evidence that they do, though the studies have found people are likely 
to shift their savings into tax-preferred forms.  Indeed, some argue that tax 
subsidies may even incent lower saving as taxpayers feel richer or 
objectively need to set aside less of their income in order to reach their 
 
 36. See Ontario Retirement Pension Plan Act, S.O. 2015, c 5, (Can.); see also ONT. 
MINISTRY OF FIN, THE ONTARIO RETIREMENT PENSION PLAN:  DISCUSSING A MADE-IN-
ONTARIO SOLUTION (2014), https://www.ontario.ca/document/ontario-retirement-pension-
plan-made-ontario-solution [https://perma.cc/6EGX-UNMJ]. 
 37. As one example, the ORPP will not be able to cover self-employed workers unless 
the ITA is amended to broaden the scope of potential membership in a tax-sheltered 
registered pension plan. See Ministry of Fin., The Ontario Retirement Pension Plan:  
Comparability, Phase-in and Benefits, NEWSROOM (Aug. 11, 2015, 9:30 AM), https://news. 
ontario.ca/mof/en/2015/08/the-ontario-retirement-pension-plan.html [https://perma.cc/J7CF-
Z8GY]. 
 38. For a contemporary history of the neoliberal turn in Canada, see JANINE BRODIE, 
POLITICS ON THE MARGINS:  RESTRUCTURING AND THE CANADIAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 49–
63 (1995).  U.S. legal scholars have more recently been examining the impact of neoliberal 
ideas on legal regulation and reasoning. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, 
Introduction:  Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2014). 
 39. Studies from several jurisdictions on the impact of tax incentives on savings 
behavior are reviewed in Benjamin Alarie, Assessing Tax Free Savings Accounts—Promises 
and Pressures, 57 CAN. TAX J. 504 (2009); Barbara Austin, Policies, Preferences and 
Perversions in the Tax-Assisted Retirement Savings System, 41 MCGILL L.J. 571 (1996); 
Kesselman & Spiro, supra note 29; Jinyan Li, Tax Treatment of Retirement Savings Plans:  
Past, Present, and Future, in TAX EXPENDITURES:  STATE OF THE ART 18–20 (Lisa Philipps, 
Neil Brooks & Jinyan Li eds., 2011). 
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target savings.  Canada’s household savings rate has declined from its peak 
in the 1980s and remains lower than 1995 levels despite the increasing 
generosity of tax incentives for retirement and other savings.40  On the other 
hand, household debt as a percentage of income has risen substantially 
since 1995.41 
It is equally challenging to substantiate the claim that registered savings 
plans are an effective instrument to combat economic insecurity.  By 1995, 
critics had already shown that registered plans disproportionately benefited 
higher-income individuals (mostly men) who have the resources to use up 
their contribution room and for whom deductions or exemptions are more 
valuable under the progressive rate structure.42  Like other wealthy western 
nations, over the two decades under study, Canada has seen a trend of 
growing inequality and concentration of income in the top 1 percent of 
earners.43  Given their distributive tilt, tax-assisted savings plans are 
unlikely to offset this trend, particularly as they are costly to government 
revenues and therefore limit the potential to expand programs that are 
redistributive to lower income groups. 
There is a gap, then, between the claim that registered plans are aimed at 
helping the broad middle class and their actual design and impact, which 
might just as likely contribute to greater economic polarization.  This gap 
has been managed politically, I argue, through a narrative that has 
constructed middle-class identity in association with particular practices 
and expectations.  The legislation itself, together with the political and 
financial planning discourses that accompany it, identify the types of self-
management and self-provisioning that condition middle-class status.  They 
present an image of middle-class individuals exercising choice and agency, 
achieving financial goals through rational planning and self-discipline.  The 
 
 40. Gilles Berube & Denise Cote, Long-Term Determinants of the Personal Savings 
Rate:  Literature Review and Some Empirical Results for Canada (Bank of Can., Working 
Paper No. 2000-3, 2000), http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/wp00-
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/86E6-AG3M].  According to Statistics Canada, the household 
savings rate dropped from 10.1 percent in the first quarter of 1995 to 5.6 percent in the final 
quarter of 1996. See CANSIM Table 380-0072, STATS. CAN., http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/ 
cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=3800072&pattern=&csic= (last visited Apr. 29, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/P4BS-279T]. 
Since the end of 1996, it has ranged from a high of 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 2001 
to a low of 0.2 percent in the first quarter of 2005. Id.  The rate was reported as 4 percent in 
the final quarter of 2015. Id. 
 41. See generally Jeannine Bailliu, Katsiaryna Kartashova & Cesaire Meh, Household 
Borrowing and Spending in Canada, BANK CAN. REV., Winter 2011–2012, at 16; Raj K. 
Chawla & Sharanjit Uppal, Household Debt in Canada, STATS. CAN., http:// 
www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2012002/article/11636-eng.htm (last modified Nov. 27, 
2015) [https://perma.cc/RDP8-EA4M]. 
 42. See generally Austin, supra note 39; Maureen Donnelly et al., The RRSP Home 
Buyers’ Plan:  Advantageous for Whom?, 41 CAN. TAX J. 293 (1993); Claire F.L. Young, 
(In)Visible Inequalities:  Women, Tax and Poverty, 27 OTTAWA L. REV. 99 (1995). 
 43. For an overview of the key studies and data on this trend, see KEVIN MILLIGAN, TAX 
POLICY FOR A NEW ERA:  PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FAIRNESS 7–11 (C.D. Howe 
Inst. 2014), https://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/benefactors_lecture_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HA4R-TNQA]. 
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expectation of annual contributions to a registered plan resonates with 
Butler’s thinking about the role of repetitive, ritualized practices in identity 
formation and reformation.44  The deferral of rewards into the future 
enables tax law to posit an aspirational middle-class subject as an ideal that 
might not be experienced in the present but is always in the process of 
being realized.  The legislative description of many of these programs as 
registered savings plans also captures something of their symbolic power:  
to register is to recognize.45 
Providing individuals with the legal ability to accrue a tax-sheltered nest 
egg also sends a complex message about the role of government in 
addressing economic inequalities.  At a surface level, it openly 
acknowledges the pervasive insecurity of even many full-time employees 
and the uncertain prospects for their children.  Yet it also implies that over-
taxation is an important cause of household economic insecurity and the 
inability to save.  Increasingly, registered savings plans are designed in 
ways that summon lower- and middle-income earners to participate, for 
example, by offering larger matching grants to taxpayers in these brackets.  
The fact that people are opening registered plans in large numbers is then 
cited as evidence that the policy is working regardless of how much or little 
money the plans hold.  Even nominal participation in such plans becomes a 
mark of middle-class status and holds out the promise of middle-class 
security at some unknown point in the future, for the next generation, if not 
the current one.  Reducing the tax burden on those who save for their own 
needs has emerged over this period as a meta-narrative of neoliberal tax 
policy and its commitments to a less redistributive state.  In its place, 
monetary rewards are conferred on those who manage to create their own 
islands of financial security.  The role of employers in this narrative also 
declined over time.  Increasingly, savings tax policy moved away from the 
joint employer-employee contribution model of traditional pension plans 
toward reliance upon individual contributions that are sometimes matched 
partially by the government. 
The two decades examined below culminated in a federal election in 
which savings tax policy was one of many issues dividing the incumbent 
Conservatives from the opposition parties.  As promised during the 
campaign, the majority Liberal government elected on October 19, 2015, 
already has moved to roll back contribution limits to one savings plan—the 
Tax Free Savings Account (TFSA)—and has confirmed its support for 
expanding parts of the public pension system.46  These high profile moves 
 
 44. See Butler, supra note 13. 
 45. See Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition, supra note 25, at 68 (arguing that 
late-twentieth century political discourse is increasingly centered on “cultural recognition,” 
as opposed to “socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice”). 
 46. Bill C-2 proposes to amend ITA section 207.01(1) to reduce the annual TFSA 
contribution limit from $10,000 to its pre-2015 level of $5500 with future inflation indexing. 
See An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, Bill C-2, 42d Parl. (first reading Dec. 9, 2015) 
(Can.), http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1 
&DocId=8064766 [https://perma.cc/C5BR-FXN4]; Joint Statement by Prime Minister-
Designate Justin Trudeau and Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne, LIBERAL (Oct. 27, 2015), 
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signal a shift in narrative and perhaps a degree of resistance to the construct 
of middle-class identity advanced most recently in Conservative tax policy.  
However, this construct also has been internalized and embedded in 
Canadian income tax law and financial planning practices to such a degree 
that sweeping change is unlikely in the short term.  Notably, apart from 
reducing the upper limit on TFSA contributions, opposition party platforms 
advanced during the 2015 election season did not challenge any of the 
registered savings plans that have proliferated over the last two decades. 
III.  REGISTERED SAVINGS PLAN GROWTH DURING 
THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENTS OF 1995–2005 
Until the mid-1990s, tax-assisted saving was focused squarely on 
retirement via two main types of plans:  employer-sponsored Registered 
Pension Plans (RPPs) and individual or group Registered Retirement 
Savings Plans47 (RRSPs).  Both operate on a post-paid (that is, tax-
deferred) model in which contributions are deductible, investment returns 
are tax sheltered while in the plan, and withdrawals are included in income.  
RPPs are by definition funded by joint employer and employee 
contributions out of employment income.  They encompass both traditional 
defined-benefit plans and increasingly popular defined-contribution plans in 
which employees bear greater market risk.  RRSPs are most commonly 
individual plans to which a taxpayer may contribute out of “earned 
income”—meaning employment, rental, or business income.48  Annual 
contributions to an RPP or RRSP are subject to a combined limit equal to 
18 percent of qualifying income, up to a specified dollar maximum each 
year.49 
The Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chretien came to power 
in 1993 and launched a multiyear program of fiscal austerity and deficit 
reduction.  The 1995 federal budget implemented deep cuts to direct 
program spending and to provincial transfer payments to fund health, 
education, and social programs.50  The stated aim was to “fundamentally 
reform what the federal government does and how it does it.”51  The budget 
 
https://www.liberal.ca/joint-statement-by-prime-minister-designate-justin-trudeau-and-
ontario-premier-kathleen-wynne/ (promising to “be active partners in the national discussion 
on pension enhancement”) [https://perma.cc/F9NL-APJN]. 
 47. The basic rules are set out in ITA section 147.1 (RPPs) and section 146 (RRSPS). 
See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, §§ 146, 147.1 (Can.).  A technical discussion of the 
various registered savings plans is beyond the scope of this Article.  For more details on the 
tax-assisted retirement savings regime as it stood in the mid-1990s, see Austin, supra note 
39, at 574–77. 
 48. “Earned income” is defined in section 146(1) of the ITA. Income Tax Act § 146(1). 
 49. The dollar limit was $15,500 in 1995 and has been raised incrementally to $24,930 
for 2015 (meaning the maximum contribution is reached at income of $138,500). See id. 
§§ 146(1), 147.1(1) (defining “RRSP dollar limit” in § 146(1) and “money purchase limit” in 
§ 147.1(1)). 
 50. DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., BUDGET PLAN (1995), http://fin.gc.ca/budget95/binb/ 
budget1995-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5DQ-L84A].  Historical federal budget documents 
are available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/access/budinfo-eng.asp [https://perma.cc/QC3Y-R7V5]. 
 51. DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., supra note 50, at 6. 
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was balanced by 1997, and several years of surplus budgets followed at the 
federal level.  Presented with this fiscal maneuvering room, Finance 
Minister Paul Martin introduced a series of tax cuts.  New incentives were 
introduced for personal saving, with a particular focus on saving for post-
secondary education and retirement. 
The Registered Education Savings Plan (RESP) was a focal point of this 
effort.52  Though available in the statute since 1975, RESPs had been 
unpopular because there was a risk of forfeiting investment income if the 
beneficiary did not attain post-secondary education.  Unlike the RPP and 
RRSP, it is a prepaid plan, allowing individuals to make after-tax 
contributions to a trust in which investment income is sheltered from tax.  
Once a beneficiary begins post-secondary education, the contributions can 
be distributed tax-free, while investment returns are included in the 
beneficiary’s income when distributed and therefore generally are taxed at a 
low marginal rate. 
The government moved to raise both the annual and lifetime contribution 
limits for RESPs and to reduce the risk of forfeiture by creating more 
flexibility to transfer RESP funds to a sibling or into a contributor’s 
RRSP.53  The reforms were “to encourage parents to save for their 
children[’s] education over the long-term” and also “so that students and 
their families will be better able to deal with the increased costs of 
education.”54  More ambitious changes were announced in 1998 as part of a 
“Canadian Opportunities Strategy,” described by the Finance Minister as an 
effort to bolster upward mobility through higher education: 
The backbone of a country is the strength of its middle class. 
 There is no better way to reduce the gap between rich and poor, no 
surer way to widen the mainstream, no more meaningful way to reduce 
the numbers of those left behind, and no better way to provide a higher 
quality of life for Canadians, than to facilitate the path to greater 
education. 
 Quite simply, every Canadian who wants to learn should have the 
opportunity to do so.55 
The Finance Minister also spoke about federal-provincial relations, 
acknowledging that “[e]ducation is a matter of provincial jurisdiction” but 
asserting a role for the federal government in supporting equality of 
opportunity to access higher education.56  While this objective could have 
been served by increasing provincial transfers that were cut in 1995 in order 
 
 52. See Income Tax Act§ 146.1. 
 53. The annual limit was raised in two stages from $1500 to $4000 and the lifetime limit 
from $31,500 to $42,000. See DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., BUDGET PLAN 157 (1996), 
http://fin.gc.ca/budget96/bp/bp96e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3392-274J]; DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., 
BUDGET PLAN 178–83 (1997), http://fin.gc.ca/budget97/binb/bp/bp97e.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M7QN-C9V7]. 
 54. Hon. Paul Martin, Minister of Fin., Budget Speech 19 (Mar. 6, 1996), 
http://fin.gc.ca/budget96/speech/speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH2B-8ZUE]. 
 55. Hon. Paul Martin, Minister of Fin., Budget Speech 11 (Feb. 24, 1998), 
https://fin.gc.ca/budget98/speech/speeche.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMQ6-FTEX]. 
 56. Id. 
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to eliminate the federal deficit, the federal government chose instead to 
introduce new programs of its own through the income tax. 
The centerpiece of the RESP strategy was a new matching grant, the 
Canada Education Savings Grant (CESG), equal to 20 percent of annual 
contributions to an RESP of up to $2000 (that is, up to $400 annually).  The 
announcement heralded “the beginning of a new partnership with parents” 
in which provincial governments would have “a role to play investing 
alongside those who seek to save for their children’s education.”57  In 
addition, taxpayers would now be able to carry forward any unused 
contribution room so that those unable to save in the present could “catch 
up in later years.”58  Minister Martin explained that saving for education 
should become as normal as saving for retirement: 
As a result of the initiatives we are taking, RESPs will now be among the 
most attractive savings vehicles available for a child’s education. 
 We believe that RESPs will soon come to be considered as essential 
for future planning as registered retirement savings plans are now. 
 They represent one of the best things parents can do for their children, 
one of the best things grandparents can do for their grandchildren—it 
speaks to the partnership of generations.59 
The capacity of all well-disciplined families to save at least some money for 
education is assumed in this narrative and reinforced with images like the 
following:  “Today, Canadians are already saving for their children in many 
ways.  Some buy bonds.  Some set up special bank accounts.  Many simply 
set aside a bit of money whenever they can.  Grandparents, aunts and uncles 
put money away at birthdays and at Christmas.”60 
The implication, as pointed out by contemporary critics, is that all 
families have the choice to save and failure to do so “is simply the result of 
exercising a personal preference for consumption.”61  Government is 
portrayed not only as a public body responsible for leveling the playing 
field, but also as an investment partner who gets involved only in 
proportion to the private initiative of individual savers.  The RESP is 
represented as a mass savings vehicle.  By implication, failure to participate 
would be considered abnormal and perhaps even a form of parental 
negligence. 
Within a few years, evidence emerged that the benefit of RESP 
enhancements was heavily skewed to favor higher-income families.62  
Perhaps in response to such criticisms, the 2004 budget added two new 
 
 57. Id. at 18. 
 58. Id. at 19. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Maureen Donnelly, Robert Welch & Allister Young, Registered Education Savings 
Plans:  A Tax Incentive Response to Higher Education Access, 47 CAN. TAX J. 81, 92 (1999). 
 62. See KEVIN MILLIGAN, TAX PREFERENCES FOR EDUCATION SAVING:  ARE RESPS 
EFFECTIVE? 1, 13 (C.D. Howe Inst. 2002) (reporting that only 6.3 percent of children in 
families with income under $30,000 had an RESP in their name, compared to 29.9 percent in 
families with at least $80,000 of income). 
2016] REGISTERED SAVINGS PLANS & MIDDLE-CLASS CANADA 2691 
RESP features aimed at including lower-income parents at least nominally 
in the program.  First, families meeting an income test could have a 
“Canada Learning Bond” of $500 deposited into an RESP without the need 
for any contributions of their own.  This would be supplemented by $100 
for each subsequent year, up to a maximum government contribution of 
$2000 per child.  Second, the CESG matching grant rate was increased to 
40 percent for taxpayers with household income up to $35,000 and to 30 
percent for those with income between $35,000 and $70,000 on the first 
$500 of their own contributions.63 
The effectiveness of delivering low-income education subsidies through 
the RESP program remains in doubt.  The Canada Learning Bond still 
requires parents to establish an RESP, even if the government is the only 
contributor.  As a result, only about 15 percent of qualifying taxpayers had 
received the Canada Learning Bond by 2008.64  A further issue is that the 
Canada Student Loan Program treats RESP withdrawals as income for the 
purposes of determining loan eligibility, meaning that loans to low-income 
youth may be reduced by any RESP payments they receive.65  While these 
may be unintended consequences, they flow from a basic policy choice to 
favor private savings plans in principle over more direct forms of 
intervention.  The Canada Learning Bond sends the message that even low-
income earners can raise middle-class children through rational planning 
and the exercise of financial self-discipline. 
Incentives for retirement saving are a second area of active tax reform in 
this first decade under study.  Canada’s pension system is famously based 
on three “pillars”:  (1)  modest government-funded benefits targeted to 
seniors with lower and middle incomes; (2)  the government-sponsored 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP), funded with contributions from paid workers 
and employers, providing maximum annual benefits of around $12,500 
(indexed to inflation); and (3)  private tax-assisted savings plans including 
RPPs and RRSPs.66  Pension analysts increasingly have raised concerns that 
many Canadians are not saving enough to provide a reasonable level of 
income replacement in retirement.67  The causal factors are familiar to 
many countries and include the decline of secure full-time employment 
with benefits, employers shifting away from defined-benefit pension plans 
to defined-contribution plans in which more risk is borne by workers, low 
 
 63. DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., BUDGET 2004:  LEARNING:  CORNERSTONE OF CANADA’S 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (2004), http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget04/pdf/paleae.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SA8V-F2C6]. 
 64. See Azim Essaji & Christine Neill, Delivering Government Grants to Students 
Through the RESP System—Distributional Implications, 60 CAN. TAX J. 635, 647 (2012). 
 65. See id. at 648. 
 66. See generally JIM LEECH & JACQUIE MCNISH, THE THIRD RAIL:  CONFRONTING OUR 
PENSION FAILURES (2013) (providing an excellent overview of the Canadian pension system, 
its historical development, and contemporary challenges). 
 67. See, e.g., David A. Dodge & Richard Dion, Macroeconomic Aspects of Retirement 
Savings, BENNETT JONES, LLP (Apr. 2014), https://www.bennettjones.com/uploadedFiles/ 
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rates of investment return, and longer life expectancies.  Until very recently, 
federal pension policy has favored a response based on voluntary 
mechanisms that use the tax system to incentivize more private saving. 
This strategy was evident by 1996, when the Chretien government 
announced it would eliminate the seven-year limit on carrying forward 
RRSP contribution room.  The rationale for allowing indefinite carry 
forward was as follows: 
First, we know that many younger Canadians have a difficult time finding 
the money to make full RRSP contributions.  This is often due to other 
pressing obligations, including education or raising a family.  We want to 
give them the maximum opportunity later in life to help make up for that 
lost time. 
 Therefore, we will allow Canadians unlimited time to make up for any 
years when they were unable to make their full contribution by 
eliminating the current seven year limit on carrying forward any unused 
contribution room.68 
The message here again acknowledges the financial strain facing taxpayers 
and the difficulty of saving, with government stepping up to provide more 
assistance through the tax system.  The “opportunity” provided by 
government is premised upon a life-cycle understanding of inequality in 
which low incomes are a temporary phenomenon associated with the early 
phases of adulthood.  The passage implies an expectation of steady upward 
mobility, such that individuals who make the right choices and manage 
their affairs well should be able to catch up on their RRSP payments later in 
life. 
A final notable development during 1996 to 2005 is the Lifelong 
Learning Plan (LLP), which combined savings for retirement and education 
under one tax policy roof.  Announced in 1998, the LLP allows an 
individual to withdraw up to $20,000 from an RRSP tax-free in order to 
fund post-secondary education for herself or her spouse.69  The funds must 
be repaid to the RRSP within ten years or be included in income.  The 
Finance Minister explained in his budget speech: 
 Effective January 1999, Canadians will be able to make tax-free 
withdrawals from their RRSPs to support full-time education and training. 
 There are few things more critical to ensuring an adequate income in 
retirement than ensuring a good income when working.  Providing 
opportunity to improve skills is an important way to make sure that 
happens. 
 
 68. Martin, supra note 54, at 23.  The annual ceiling on RRSP contributions—and on 
contributions to, or benefit accruals under, an RPP— also was raised moderately during this 
period, first to $18,000 and then prospectively to $22,000, with inflation indexing to 
commence after 2009. See DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., BUDGET PLAN 327 (2003), http://fin.gc.ca/ 
budget03/PDF/bp2003e.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6G4-TPAA]; DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., BUDGET 
PLAN 368 (2005), http://fin.gc.ca/budget05/pdf/bp2005e.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWV6-
QGCC]. 
 69. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985,§ 146.02 (Can.). 
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 The office worker who wishes to enhance their computer skills, the 
assembly line worker who wants to retrain as a machinist—these 
Canadians and more will now have access to a resource that, until now, 
they were prevented from using.70 
 The irony of encouraging retirement saving only to promote early 
withdrawal of those funds to cover education expenses highlights the basic 
limitation of savings plans:  they cannot buffer individuals against future 
need unless they have more than enough to meet their present needs.  At 
bottom, the LLP holds out upward mobility onto the higher rungs of the 
labor market as the only real solution to insecurity and places on the 
individual’s shoulders almost all of the risk of drawing down retirement 
funds to pay for additional education.  In sum, government engages in a 
shell game of providing “opportunity” to taxpayers through access to their 
own tax-assisted savings. 
IV.  REGISTERED SAVINGS PLAN GROWTH 
IN THE HARPER GOVERNMENT ERA:  2006–2015 
The Conservative Party, led by Stephen Harper, won a minority 
government in 2006 and, after two more elections, won a majority in 2011.  
Political pressure built throughout this period to expand the CPP in light of 
declining private pension coverage and evidence that a significant 
percentage of Canadians did not have sufficient savings to provide 
reasonable levels of income replacement in retirement.71  The CPP is a 
legislated mandatory plan for all employees funded by matching employer 
and employee contributions.  The self-employed may elect to participate on 
a self-funded basis.  It provides a guaranteed defined benefit based on years 
of contribution.  CPP contributions are subsidized through the tax system, 
but less heavily so than private retirement savings plans.72 
The Conservative government resisted calls to expand the CPP 
throughout its time in power and also indicated it would not cooperate with 
Ontario’s decision to create the ORPP as a provincial counterpart to the 
CPP.  Instead, the government worked energetically to augment the suite of 
registered savings plans available to individuals.73  In each case, it 
 
 70. See Martin, supra note 55, at 17–18. 
 71. See, e.g., Dodge & Dion, supra note 67; Keith Horner, Approaches to Strengthening 
Canada’s Retirement Income System, 57 CAN. TAX J. 419 (2009); Jonathan R. Kesselman, 
Expanding Canada Pension Plan Retirement Benefits:  Assessing Big CPP Proposals 3 
(Univ. of Calgary:  The Sch. of Pub. Policy, SPP Research Paper No. 3:6, 2010). 
 72. For 2014, the Department of Finance has projected a revenue cost of $9.1 billion for 
the CPP tax credit and nontaxation of employer contributions (this includes parallel 
treatment for the Quebec Pension Plan).  This compares to a projected net revenue cost of 
$21.6 billion for RPPs and $13.2 billion for RRSPs. See Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 
2014, tbl.1, DEP’T FIN. CAN., http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2014/taxexp14-eng.asp 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RFA8-7XNZ]. 
 73. See MOWAT CTR., supra note 34, at 6–7; Bill Curry, Tories Previously Rejected 
Voluntary CPP Expansion Party Now Proposes, GLOBE & MAIL (May 27, 2015, 5:18 PM), 
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expansion-raises-questions/article24647695 [https://perma.cc/AJW9-4FFC]. 
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emphasized the importance of individual choice, personal responsibility, 
and the expectation that ordinary or middle-class Canadians can provide for 
themselves and their dependents with the help of these special vehicles.  
This narrative was a seamless continuation of that started by the Liberal 
government in the decade before and aligned well with the Conservatives’ 
philosophical commitments to a less interventionist government with lower 
taxes and spending. 
The 2007 budget announced a new Registered Disability Savings Plan, 
which included government-matching grants, intended “to help parents and 
others save for the long-term financial security of a child with a severe 
disability.”74  It also further enhanced the RESP by removing the annual 
contribution limit and increasing the lifetime limit from $42,000 to $50,000, 
among other changes, “to provide additional flexibility and further 
encourage additional savings for post-secondary education.”75  However, 
the Harper government’s most important initiative in this area was 
introducing the TFSA in 2009.76 
The TFSA is a pre-paid savings plan with a full exemption for accruing 
income and withdrawals and no restriction on the timing of withdrawals or 
recontributions.  It was introduced with a $5000 annual contribution limit 
(later indexed to $5500) with no restrictions on the source of funds.  
Unused contribution room can be carried forward indefinitely.  Property 
transferred to a spouse and contributed to a TFSA also is exempt from the 
attribution rules that normally curtail income splitting in the ITA so that a 
single-earner couple can establish two TFSAs.77  In announcing the new 
plan in 2008, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty described in vivid terms whom 
it was meant to help: 
If we are to help families prepare for the long term, we must ensure 
Canadians have the right incentives to save for the future. 
 Saving isn’t always easy.  But it’s important. 
 Unfortunately, for too long, government punished people who did the 
right thing. 
As one of my constituents recently said to me: 
I go to work.  I collect my pay.  I pay my taxes.  And after I pay my 
expenses each month, I try to put some money away.  I don’t have a 
lot.  But I am reaching my goal. 
Yet, the federal government taxes me on what I earn on my savings 
and my investments.  Savings and investments I socked away with 
after-tax income.  Why am I being punished for doing the right thing? 
 
 74. See DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., BUDGET PLAN 379 (2007), http://www.budget.gc.ca/2007/ 
pdf/bp2007e.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMF4-Q3XM]; see also Income Tax Act, § 146.4. 
 75. See DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., supra note 74, at 390. 
 76. Income Tax Act § 146.2. 
 77. For a more detailed review of the TFSA and a comparison to the U.S. Roth IRA and 
U.K. Individual Savings Account, see Alarie, supra note 39. 
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 Mr. Speaker, he’s right.  And we’re going to change that.78 
The image in this speech is of a modest earner who sets financial goals and 
can reach them through self-disciplined saving if only the government does 
not get in his way. 
This narrative was reinforced in 2015 when the government announced, 
in the lead up to the federal election, that it would raise the TFSA annual 
contribution limit to $10,000: 
[C]lose to 11 million Canadians—mostly low and middle-income 
Canadians—have opened a TFSA. 
 Who are these Canadians?  They are the people you see in the coffee 
shop and at the rink and in your place of worship.  Half make less than 
$42,000 a year. 
 Some are saving money to buy their first home, or to start their first 
business.  Some are saving to put their children through college or 
university.  Others are putting away extra income to make their hard-
earned retirement more comfortable and enjoyable.79 
In marketing the TFSA, financial service providers echo this story of 
planning for a more secure future by setting and working toward financial 
goals through regular contributions.  Starting a TFSA is lauded as a step 
toward social mobility or comfortable retirement, toward taking control of 
one’s future, without regard to the quantum of assets available to fund it. 
The Harper government cited mass enrollment as evidence that the TFSA 
targets the broad middle class.  However, several studies have criticized the 
TFSA’s clear distributional bias in favor of higher income taxpayers.  
Jonathan Rhys Kesselman found that individuals earning over $200,000 had 
a 58 percent participation rate in 2011, compared to 20 percent for those 
with income under $20,000—a figure that includes the spouses of higher-
income individuals who have funded a spousal TFSA.80  The lesser 
capacity of lower- and middle-income individuals to contribute their full 
limit, combined with the ability of high-income earners to take on greater 
risk in their choice of investments, and the fact that even normal TFSA 
returns are not taxed, will accentuate the upper skew as time goes on.81  
Indeed, Kesselman estimated that raising the limit to $10,000 benefits only 
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those earning above $200,000, as pre-existing tax sheltered plans were 
ample to accommodate the savings of taxpayers with income up to that 
level.82  Also, some participants likely are using the perpetual carry forward 
of TFSA room to receive inter vivos gifts or bequests, enabling tax-
sheltered transmission of wealth across generations.83 
The revenue costs of the TFSA, modest at the outset with a tax prepaid 
vehicle, also will increase throughout the coming decades as more untaxed 
investment returns accumulate.84  Kevin Milligan projected that, with a 
$10,000 limit in place for thirty years, the federal tax base would shrink by 
approximately 6 percent, with provincial revenue reductions adding to this 
because of the common definition of the tax base.85  He concluded that, if 
the TFSA is allowed to grow as projected, the impact on the taxation of 
capital income in Canada will be “substantial—and one is tempted to say 
revolutionary,” leading to “a noticeable decline in the federal tax base and 
an even bigger impact on federal revenues.”86  As such, it will limit the 
government’s fiscal room to spend in ways that might counter balance the 
distributional tilt of the TFSA. 
Finally, the second decade also saw the creation of the Pooled Registered 
Pension Plan (PRPP), a voluntary post-paid plan for employees or the self-
employed who lack access to an employer-sponsored RPP or RRSP.87  
Employer contributions are permitted but not mandatory.  This new vehicle 
works much like an RRSP, but was presented by the government as filling a 
gap in the retirement savings system by allowing for “low cost” 
administration of pooled pension savings.88  The PRPP fits with the pattern 
of emphasizing choice for savers, a lesser role for employers, and providing 
a savings vehicle that in principle is accessible to everyone who wishes to 
secure their future. 
CONCLUSION 
This two-decade overview of registered savings plan reform has sought 
to highlight a performative dimension of tax policy that can help to account 
for the political salience of ideas at particular times with decision makers 
and, critically, with the voting and taxpaying public.  Registered savings 
plans have gained deep traction with Canadians despite their glaring 
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limitations as a tool for responding to economic insecurity and precarity.  
Their widespread acceptance and adoption as a common sense policy 
instrument is due in part, I argue, to the normative ideal of middle-class 
identity that they have helped to produce—one based on choice, agency, 
and the promise of future social mobility for oneself or one’s children 
through self-discipline and self-management.  Simply having a registered 
savings account became a mark of middle-class values and status during 
this period, conferring a form of cultural recognition that went beyond its 
capacity to meet material needs.  Through the practice of annual 
contributions (or annual shame and anxiety for missing the opportunity to 
contribute), the registered plan has become normalized and internalized as a 
part of middle-class existence.89  To be an adult without a registered 
savings plan now threatens to place one on the margins of the social order. 
Looking at taxation through this lens also provides insight about the 
intensity of public divisions over proposals to increase the TFSA or expand 
public pensions through the CPP or ORPP.  The 2015 election campaign 
provided further evidence that taxation is not a question of calculable 
interests alone but also one of quasi-moral values.  This was evident in 
some of the competing viewpoints on whether middle-class Canadians were 
better served by the Harper government’s $10,000 TFSA limit or promises 
by the opposition New Democratic Party and Liberals to roll it back to its 
previous level of $5500.  The Liberal campaign platform centered on the 
idea of middle-class stagnation and pledged to prioritize “the middle class 
and all those working hard to join it.”  In contrast, speeches by Mr. Harper 
explicitly tied the TFSA to middle-class prosperity.  As one supporter of the 
$10,000 limit put it after the election, “[T]here’s nothing more middle class 
than ordinary Canadians striving to build retirement savings with 
TFSAs.”90  Yet new research findings on the limited uptake of TFSAs by 
those with lower incomes fed into an emerging narrative about the middle 
class being left behind.91 
Finally, the performative quality of tax policy in shaping normative 
ideals of middle-class identity also may help to explain the persistence of 
registered savings plans even after their distributional effects have attracted 
widespread skepticism.  While the new Liberal government already has 
tabled legislation to roll back the TFSA limit, it has not proposed to 
eliminate it nor to reexamine the other registered savings plans introduced 
or expanded over the last two decades.  Any such move would no doubt 
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elicit strong protest from affluent voters who are well-served by these plans.  
Even among the broader population, tax-assisted saving for all manner of 
life needs has become accepted as a common sense practice that signifies 
membership in an aspiring middle class.  Registered savings plans will 
endure not because they actually deliver the benefits they promise to most 
people but rather because they have been assimilated into Canadian middle-
class identity. 
